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PulvinarFollowing destruction or denervation of the primary visual cortex (V1) cortical blindness
ensues. Affective blindsight refers to the uncanny ability of such patients to respond cor-
rectly, or above chance level, to visual emotional expressions presented to their blind
fields. Fifteen years after its original discovery, affective blindsight still fascinates neurosci-
entists and philosophers alike, as it offers a unique window on the vestigial properties of
our visual system that, though present in the intact brain, tend to be unnoticed or even
actively inhibited by conscious processes. Here we review available studies on affective
blindsight with the intent to clarify its functional properties, neural bases and theoretical
implications. Evidence converges on the role of subcortical structures of old evolutionary
origin such as the superior colliculus, the pulvinar and the amygdala in mediating affective
blindsight and nonconscious perception of emotions. We conclude that approaching con-
sciousness, and its absence, from the vantage point of emotion processing may uncover
important relations between the two phenomena, as consciousness may have evolved as
an evolutionary specialization to interact with others and become aware of their social
and emotional expressions.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Contemporary neuroscience is replete with examples of social and affective processes that occur without or outside con-
scious experience (de Gelder, de Haan, & Heywood, 2001; de Gelder, Hortensius, & Tamietto, 2012; de Gelder & Tamietto,
2011; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier, 2005). This evidence has contributed significantly to the burgeoning field
of social and affective neuroscience. Possibly, the most insightful and direct access to nonconscious perception of emotional
signals is provided by studies on patients with cortical blindness following destruction of the primary visual cortex (V1). In
fact, such patients cannot see nor visually acknowledge a visual stimulus presented within the blind area of their visual field
(scotoma). The phenomenon, referred to as ‘‘affective blindsight’’, denotes the uncanny ability of such patients to respond
correctly, or above chance level, to emotionally salient visual stimuli presented to their blind fields (Anders et al., 2004,
2009; Bertini, Cecere, & Ladavas, 2013; Cecere, Bertini, Maier, & Ladavas, 2014; de Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; de Gelder,
Morris, & Dolan, 2005; de Gelder, Pourtois, van Raamsdonk, Vroomen, & Weiskrantz, 2001; de Gelder, Pourtois, &Clinical
gnition
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Hamm et al., 2003; Heywood & Kentridge, 2000; Morris, DeGelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, &
Seghier, 2005; Rossion, de Gelder, Pourtois, Guerit, & Weiskrantz, 2000; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008; Tamietto, Pullens, de
Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Goebel, 2012; Tamietto et al., 2009; Van den Stock et al., 2011). As is the case for the original phe-
nomenon of ‘‘blindsight’’ (Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974), the ‘‘blind’’ com-
ponent in affective blindsight refers to the patients’ statement of not seeing or consciously perceiving the emotional stimuli,
while the ‘‘sight’’ component reflects their residual ability to respond, discriminate or display spontaneous expressive and
physiological responses that are appropriate to the specific emotional content of the visual signals they are presented with.
Affective blindsight is thus clearly linked to blindsight, but it also poses new questions and has implications for theories of
consciousness besides the classic themes tackled in the blindsight literature. In fact, a traditional distinction in the study of
consciousness and its neural correlates is between state consciousness and content consciousness (Park & Tallon-Baudry,
2014; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002; Tsuchiya & Adolphs, 2007). The former applies to the whole organism and refers to vig-
ilance states such as wakefulness, alertness, drowsiness, and coma, whereas the latter denotes that we are aware of the
external world or of ourselves. Traditionally, blindsight represents a privileged case-study to tackle the functions of stimulus
awareness and, by comparison with conscious vision, to discover the neural signature of content consciousness (Cowey,
2004). As we will discuss in detail later, approaching consciousness, and its absence, from the vantage point of emotion pro-
cessing may help to reconcile these two aspects of consciousness that have been barely considered within the same frame-
work. In fact, the intersection between emotion and consciousness seems more radical than what was initially envisaged:
not only do emotional signals have a privileged access to consciousness, but several subcortical structures that are important
for emotion processing partly overlap with structures involved in the maintenance of state consciousness (Craig, 2009;
Critchley, 2005; Damasio, 1999; de Gelder & Tamietto, 2011; Mitchell & Greening, 2012; Panksepp, 2005; Park &
Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Tamietto et al., 2005; Tsuchiya & Adolphs, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2005).
Seen from an evolutionary perspective, this is consistent with the thesis that consciousness evolved in the process, and as
a consequence, of the demands of the social and emotional environment (Humphrey, 1983). We would like to argue that this
broad affective-evolutionary perspective on consciousness may also be applied to the visual system, at least as a heuristic
principle, and may orient the search for specific hypotheses about phylogenetically ancient emotional sensitivity of the
visual system of higher organisms.
In this review we will present the studies and evidence accumulating on affective blindsight since its original discovery
fifteen years ago, and discuss their theoretical impact for advancing our understanding of the neural mechanisms linking
social and emotional vision to consciousness.2. The origins
The first evidence that one patient with destruction of V1 was proficient at discriminating the emotional content of visual
stimuli presented to his blind field, without consciously perceiving them, was provided by de Gelder and coworkers in 1999
(de Gelder et al., 1999). The study involved patient GY, a patient with blindness in his right visual field following a lesion to
his left V1 and well-documented blindsight (for a detailed description of the patient see: Baseler, Morland, & Wandell, 1999;
Bridge, Thomas, Jbabdi, & Cowey, 2008; Goebel, Muckli, Zanella, Singer, & Stoerig, 2001; Tamietto et al., 2010). In May 1997
GY came to our lab in Tilburg, accompanied by Larry Weiskrantz, to give us the opportunity to test some of Paul Bertelson’s
ideas about the automaticity of ventriloquism and to participate in ongoing studies on the role of visual awareness in audio-
visual speech perception. During one of the breaks between these long testing sessions (which ultimately yielded negative
results), one of us tried to present facial expressions to GY’s blind field and affective blindsight was discovered. The finding
was welcomed by healthy skepticism (de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 2000; Heywood & Kentridge, 2000), con-
sistent with the notion that encoding face stimuli is too complex for the visual system deprived of its primary visual cortex
(Cowey, 2004; Cowey, 2010). The study consisted of 4 different experiments in which short video clips and still images with
happy, sad, angry and fearful facial expressions were presented to the blind as well as intact field of GY. The task required the
patient to guess in various forced-choice conditions the emotion conveyed by the stimuli he remained unaware of.
Surprisingly, GY was able to discriminate the expressions in his blind field with a reliability exceeding chance level.
Growing evidence in the same period from a number of different areas turned out to be consistent with the results of this
first study. For example, neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects had shown amygdala activation along with other subcor-
tical structures receiving direct visual input from the retina, such as the superior colliculus and the pulvinar, in response to
facial expressions whose awareness was prevented by visual masking, flash suppression, or filtered in low spatial frequen-
cies (Liddell et al., 2005; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, &
Dolan, 2003; Whalen et al., 1998). Likewise, animal studies using classical conditioning on the auditory system of rodents
were demonstrating that the amygdala is able to detect emotionally salient stimuli in the environment and to initiate appro-
priate responses toward them even before a detailed perceptual analysis was provided by primary sensory cortices (LeDoux,
1996; LeDoux, 2008).
As it often happens with novel and unexpected findings, these first results raised a number of comments and (sometimes
dismissive) criticism that have been systematically addressed, and ultimately discarded, in the next years (Cowey, 2004;
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One first criticism concerned possible basic methodological drawbacks. In fact, the same stimuli projected to the blind
field of GY were also previously shown to his seeing field. Because facial expressions of basic emotions are characterized
by distinctive and easily detectable visual features (e.g., eyes wide open in fear, or lifted-up lips corners in happiness), correct
responses to unseen stimuli may be based on the association and implicit detection of such unique features when the stimuli
are first shown to the intact field (Cowey, 2004). This hypothesis was conclusively discarded after affective blindsight was
reported in patients presenting a bilateral damage to the occipital cortices (Hamm et al., 2003; Pegna et al., 2005). This con-
dition makes the patient clinically blind over the entire visual field, therefore preventing the use of visual information pre-
sented to the seeing field, as the latter simply does not exist.
Another issue concerned the peculiarity of patient GY and, therefore, the generalizability of affective blindsight to other
patients with cortical blindness. In fact, GY suffered a lesion strictly confined to his left V1 as a consequence of a traumatic
brain injury during a traffic accident that occurred very early in his life, when he was only 7 years old (Barbur, Ruddock, &
Waterfield, 1980; de Gelder et al., 2005; Morris et al., 2001; Sahraie et al., 1997). Thus, it has been proposed, and later on
verified with different neuroimaging methods, that considerable post-lesion and experience-dependent plasticity has taken
place in GY’s brain (Bridge et al., 2008; Tamietto et al., 2012). Although we will discuss the neural underpinnings of affective
blindsight in a dedicated section below, it has become increasingly clear that affective blindsight is not such a rare phe-
nomenon, for it has been reported in more than 20 different patients studied by at least five independent research teams
in several different countries (Anders et al., 2004, 2009; Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al., 2014; de Gelder & Hadjikhani,
2006; de Gelder et al., 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2014; Hamm et al., 2003; Heywood & Kentridge, 2000; Morris et al.,
2001; Pegna et al., 2005; Rossion et al., 2000; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008; Tamietto et al., 2009, 2012; Van den Stock
et al., 2011). These patients suffered different lesions to the visual cortex at different ages, but for the large majority in adult-
hood, and two of them had bilateral cortical blindness. It is therefore reasonable to surmise that affective blindsight, if ade-
quately investigated, can be found in a large population of patients with cortical blindness, devoid of GY’s peculiarity.
4. Methodological issues in the study of affective blindsight
In the last decade, following significant methodological advances in neuroscience, different measures and methods have
been used to study and document affective blindsight. They can be grouped along two orthogonal dimensions. The first
relates to the distinction between so-called ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect’’ methods, whereas the second dimension concerns the
differentiation between behavioral measures, on the one hand, and psychophysiological or neurophysiological measures,
on the other (Weiskrantz, 1990).
Direct approaches try to circumvent the lack of visual awareness for stimuli presented in the blind field by asking patients
to guess which stimulus type, among a limited number of options, has been projected within the blind field. As in the original
study, the patients, prompted by consciously perceived auditory stimuli, are forced to guess and to press different buttons for
different emotions that may be displayed (de Gelder et al., 1999; Pegna et al., 2005; Van den Stock et al., 2011). Most com-
monly, direct behavioral measures rely on response accuracy and latency. They have been criticized because they are liable
to response strategies or bias and because the (often) dichotomous nature of the measure hardly fits with the more graded
nature of our conscious experience (Mitchell & Greening, 2012; Overgaard, 2011; Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerleider,
2005). In fact, analyses of accuracy are typically based on percentage of correct responses and potentially reflect not only
patients’ sensitivity to a given stimulus attribute, but also their response bias. Therefore, following the original study of
Azzopardi and Cowey (1997), scaled reports or post-decision wagering procedures have been introduced, along with signal
detection analyses, in the study of affective blindsight or other types of nonconscious emotion perception (Tamietto et al.,
2015; Van den Stock et al., 2014). This procedure requires the patient to provide a first response concerning the pres-
ence/absence of a stimulus or of one attribute (e.g., its emotional content), and afterward to grade confidence about the first
response on a scale. This way, researchers obtain a continuous measure of awareness that can be used to construct receiver
operating characteristic curves (ROCs), fromwhich perceptual sensitivity can be derived independently of response criterion,
thereby avoiding the problem of response bias.
Indirect methods do not require that patients provide these somewhat counter-intuitive responses to unseen stimuli, but
engage them in responding to stimuli projected to their intact fields. By presenting additional stimuli simultaneously to the
blind field, evidence of nonconscious processing is inferred if unseen stimuli modulate responses to the normally visible one
(Celeghin, Savazzi, Barabas, Bendini, & Marzi, 2015; Celeghin et al., 2014; Leh, Mullen, & Ptito, 2006; Leh, Ptito,
Schonwiesner, Chakravarty, & Mullen, 2010; Marzi, Tassinari, Aglioti, & Lutzemberger, 1986; Tamietto et al., 2010). A clas-
sical example of such indirect methods is the redundant target paradigm, in which stimuli are presented either singly to the
intact field or paired simultaneously with another stimulus in the blind field. Typically, reaction times (RTs) to the seen stim-
ulus are faster during redundant stimulation than during single presentation to the intact field. This paradigm has been mod-
ified for the purposes of studying affective blindsight, thereby presenting pairs of congruent or incongruent emotional
expressions to the intact and blind field (Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al., 2014; de Gelder et al., 2001; Tamietto & de
Gelder, 2008). A congruency effect has been reported in patient GY, with congruent stimuli yielding faster RTs than incon-
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patients without blindsight, Bertini et al. (2013) found instead a boosting effect of unseen fearful expressions over con-
sciously seen faces. Moreover, indirect methods offer valuable insights into mechanisms that mediate the integration
between consciously and nonconsciously perceived emotions, both within the visual domain (Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere
et al., 2014; de Gelder et al., 2001; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008) and, in the case of cross-modal integration, between (con-
sciously perceived) auditory stimuli and (unconsciously perceived) visual expressions (de Gelder et al., 2002, 2005).
Psychophysiological responses have also been used to probe affective blindsight. These measures primarily include eye
blink (Hamm et al., 2003), skin conductance (Anders et al., 2004, 2009), pupil dilation and facial electromyography
(Tamietto et al., 2009). Eye blink recording samples the startle reflex and gets potentiated after fear conditioning to unseen
visual cues (Hamm et al., 2003). Skin conductance and pupil dilation are measures of autonomic arousal induced by sympa-
thetic system activity, and have been reported to increase during passive exposure to facial as well as bodily expressions of
emotions projected to the blind field of patients GY and DB (Tamietto et al., 2009). Lastly, electromyography has been used to
assess the presence of emotional contagion in patients with affective blindsight (Tamietto et al., 2009). Emotional contagion
refers to the spontaneous and automatic tendency to mimic the facial expressions seen in others and, consequently, to con-
verge emotionally (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Tamietto
et al., 2009). Such subtle changes in facial musculature are characteristic for different facial expressions of emotions. For
instance, happiness involves the contraction of the zygomaticus major that lifts up the corners of the mouth in a smile, while
fearful or angry expressions engage the corrugator supercilli in frowning (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg et al., 2000). Emotional
contagion, as measured with electromyography, has been shown in blindsight patients (Tamietto et al., 2009).
The advent of the neuroimaging techniques has boosted investigation of the neural substrate of affective blindsight and,
by comparison with seen emotional signals, of the underpinnings of emotional consciousness. We will discuss in a dedicated
section the functional and structural neuroanatomy of affective blindsight, while here we only sketch the purposes, major
strengths and weaknesses of the different techniques. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used to characterize
the spatial properties of the functional neuroanatomy and the structures activated by unseen emotional stimuli (Anders
et al., 2004, 2009; de Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; de Gelder et al., 2005; Morris et al., 2001; Pegna et al., 2005; Van den
Stock, Tamietto, Hervais-Adelman, Pegna, & de Gelder, 2013; Van den Stock et al., 2011, 2014). The first fMRI study on affec-
tive blindsight was performed on patient GY by Morris and colleagues and showed that unseen fearful and fear-conditioned
facial expressions activate the amygdala, whose response co-varied with activity in the superior colliculus and pulvinar
(Morris et al., 2001). The excellent spatial resolution of fMRI, on the order of millimeters, is counterbalanced by its limited
temporal resolution, as events occurring during a temporal window of a few seconds are averaged together, thus preventing
a fine-grained analysis of the temporal dynamics occurring among the implicated areas. This is a serious limitation when
studying emotions, as nonconscious emotional processing takes place within milliseconds after stimulus onset in subcortical
brain areas, including the amygdala and structures related to reflex-like motor reactions, and is followed shortly after by
later responses engaged in more deliberate responses and in conscious vision (Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti 2014;
Borgomaneri, Vitale, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2015; Garrido, Barnes, Sahani, & Dolan, 2012; Garvert, Friston, Dolan, & Garrido,
2014; Luo, Holroyd, Jones, Hendler, & Blair, 2007; Maior, Hori, Tomaz, Ono, & Nishijo, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2014). Because
both early nonconscious and later conscious responses take place within the time window of a single volume acquisition
in fMRI studies, the different functional values of neural activity in the same structure may be integrated or overridden
(Brosch & Wieser, 2011; Costa et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2010).
This limitation of fMRI has been partially circumvented by the use of methods with a better temporal resolution, such as
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG), which have a temporal resolution on the order of mil-
liseconds, but, on the other hand, have a poor spatial resolution and have been questioned when used to detect neural activ-
ity in subcortical structures (Andino, Menendez, Khateb, Landis, & Pegna, 2009; Cecere et al., 2014; de Gelder et al., 2002;
Rossion et al., 2000). Recently, tractography techniques such as diffusor tensor imaging (DTI) have been used to document
anatomical connections between structures implicated in blindsight (Bridge et al., 2008; Leh, Johansen-Berg, & Ptito, 2006)
and in affective blindsight (Tamietto et al., 2012), as well as to document post-lesion anatomical plasticity and structural
reorganization of fiber connections following lesions to the visual cortex.
Lastly, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has been used to induce ‘‘virtual lesions’’ to V1, so as to block conscious
visual perception and create experimental models of blindsight (Allen, Sumner, & Chambers, 2014; Lloyd, Abrahamyan, &
Harris, 2013; Railo, Andersson, Kaasinen, Laine, & Koivisto, 2014; Silvanto, Walsh, & Cowey, 2009) and affective blindsight
(Filmer & Monsell, 2013; Jolij & Lamme, 2005). These methods have revealed interesting parallels with the behavioral out-
comes reported in affective blindsight. In the future, a better understanding of the actual neurophysiological influences of
TMS on the intact brain will provide the basis for a closer comparison with blindsight patients and for a more comprehensive
understanding of the systems involved in conscious and nonconscious emotional processing in the intact and damaged brain.
5. When affective blindsight obtains, when it fails, and why
Facial expressions effectively communicate emotions during social interactions and, until recently, most investigations of
human emotions predominately concentrated on processes associated to conscious or nonconscious perception of faces
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literature concerns whether the emotional expression is extracted from an analysis of the whole face configuration or rather
from the extraction of individual key features in the face (Jack, Garrod, & Schyns, 2014). This issue is interesting also for affec-
tive blindsight, in particular in understanding the minimal visual input sufficient to trigger nonconscious emotion percep-
tion. Neuroimaging studies on healthy subjects in whom visual awareness was prevented by backward masking have
shown that the amygdala responds to the eye whites, which are particularly informative in conveying fear (Morris,
deBonis, & Dolan, 2002; Whalen et al., 2004). Also, in a recent fMRI study on patient TN with affective blindsight and bilateral
cortical blindness, we have reported that the amygdala responds to direct vs. averted gaze (Burra et al., 2013). This seems to
suggest that phylogenetically ancient parts of our visual and emotion systems in the brain are tuned to detect this simple
signal rather than the whole face configuration, but more investigation is clearly needed here.
Recently, affective blindsight has been tested also for non-facial stimuli, thereby extending evidence of nonconscious
emotion processing to other stimulus categories. Bodily expressions of emotions, both static and dynamic, have been the
most extensively studied non-facial stimuli. Behavioral, fMRI, and psychophysiological responses from pupil dilation and
facial EMG have shown that affective blindsight for bodily expressions may be at least as clearly established as that previ-
ously reported for facial expressions and entails a largely overlapping neural system (de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder &
Hadjikhani, 2006; Tamietto et al., 2009; Van den Stock et al., 2011, 2013, 2014).
A certain degree of functional similarity between face and body signals, resulting in their similar role in sustaining non-
conscious emotion processing in affective blindsight, challenges theories exclusively concerned with analysis of the specific
visual features, and instead suggests an approach that cuts across gross physical stimulus differences, as there exist between
facial and bodily expressions, to focus more on the functional properties of visual signals. Under the assumption that the
special role of faces is not fixed by their physical properties but by their functional ones, the findings reported above con-
verge with the idea that nonconscious emotion processing in blindsight is not specific for faces, but rather for biologically
primitive emotional expressions that are clearly associated with action tendencies and to which we are evolutionary pre-
pared to respond (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010).
Our critical perspective on the alleged special status of faces in triggering nonconscious perception seems in keeping with
evidence about failure of blindsight when patients are exposed to stimuli that do not clearly share the properties described
above. For example, patients with blindsight fail to guess non-emotional facial attributes correctly, such as personal identity
or gender (Rossion et al., 2000). Furthermore, facial expressions of complex social emotions, such as arrogance or guilt, also
fail to trigger affective blindsight (Celeghin, Adenzato, et al., in preparation). Likewise, complex affective scenes, such as pic-
tures of cockroaches or houses on fire, do not induce affective blindsight, indicating that the patients are unable to guess the
emotional content of these scenes (de Gelder et al., 2002). This suggests that the analysis of the emotional content of com-
plex scenes, facial identity or expressions of social emotions may depend critically on conscious visual perception and on the
detailed processing of the high spatial frequency information that is typically performed by the cortical visual system.
We have recently addressed this issue in a combined behavioral/fMRI experiment on patients GY and TN (Tamietto et al.,
in preparation). Fearful and neutral faces were filtered so as to contain only low or only high spatial frequency information.
In fact, previous studies have demonstrated that distinct neural pathways in the visual system are differentially sensitive to
high and low spatial frequency information in facial expressions (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). High spatial frequency informa-
tion is predominately relayed to the visual cortex and, from there, to the ventral stream via parvocellular channels with high
resolution but relatively slow responses. Conversely, low spatial frequency information is processed by the magnocellular
system that encompasses the dorsal stream as well as subcortical structures such as the superior colliculus and the pulvinar
that are likely involved in affective blindsight. We reasoned that, if affective blindsight relies on subcortical visual structures
and magnocellular channels, then the patients should be able to correctly guess the emotional expressions of faces filtered
for displaying only low spatial frequency information, whereas the same expressions filtered in high spatial frequency
should knock out the phenomenon. Preliminary behavioral evidence confirms indeed our hypothesis and provides direct
support for role of subcortical structures in mediating affective blindsight (Tamietto et al., in preparation).
6. Which neural systems mediate affective blindsight?
Starting from the seminal work of Larry Weiskrantz (1956), who first showed that bilateral lesions to the amygdala in
monkeys were sufficient to induce a loss of reactivity to emotional visual stimuli typical of the Kluver-Bucy syndrome,
the amygdala has been a central structure in the study of emotions. The main pathway for the transmission of visual infor-
mation from the retina to the amygdala passes through striate and extrastriate cortex along the ventral stream (e.g., LeDoux,
1996). However, earlier studies in rats underlined the role of midbrain structures in providing a rapid but coarse analysis of
the affective value of auditory as well as visual stimuli and in relaying such information to the amygdala – even bypassing
the primary sensory cortices (Campeau & Davis, 1995a; Campeau & Davis, 1995b; Doron & Ledoux, 1999; Jones & Burton,
1976; LeDoux, 1996; Linke, De Lima, Schwegler, & Pape, 1999; Shi & Davis, 2001).
Reviewing a wide number or neuroimaging and lesion studies investigating nonconscious emotion perception, we con-
cluded that, as far as affective blindsight and sensory unawareness of emotions is concerned, evidence was converging on the
existence of a subcortical route from the superior colliculus to the amygdala via the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus (de
Gelder, van Honk, & Tamietto, 2011; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). Clearly, the existence of such a pathway does not excludePlease cite this article in press as: Celeghin, A., et al. From affective blindsight to emotional consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition
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& Adolphs, 2011). We will first consider functional and anatomical evidence and discuss in a separate session the timing
issue and processing speed in the subcortical pathway to the amygdala.
6.1. Functional and structural neuroanatomy
Neuroimaging data on healthy subjects in whom nonconscious perception of emotions had been induced by experimental
manipulations such as visual masking, flash suppression, or spatial filtering have revealed that the superior colliculus, pul-
vinar and amygdala constitute a functional network that shows increased, positive covariation of activity in response to non-
consciously perceived fearful facial expressions (Liddell et al., 2005; Morris et al., 1999; Vuilleumier et al., 2003; Whalen
et al., 1998, 2004; Williams et al., 2006). By contrast, the major cortical pathway relaying visual input to the amygdala does
not show substantial activity and functional connectivity under the same conditions but does so during conscious perception
of emotional stimuli (Pasley, Mayes, & Schultz, 2004; Williams et al., 2006). Not surprisingly, similar findings have been
reported in patients with affective blindsight in response to unseen facial and bodily expressions and indicate that a func-
tional subcortical pathway to the amygdala is engaged during nonconscious emotion perception (de Gelder et al., 2005;
Morris et al., 2001; Pegna et al., 2005; Van den Stock et al., 2011, 2013).
The functional role of the superior colliculus and pulvinar in processing emotional expressions has received independent
support from recent single cell recordings in monkeys (macaca fuscata) (Nguyen et al., 2014). In fact, a subpopulation of
superior colliculus’ neurons responds to face and face-like visual stimuli, and its response properties are not influenced when
by low spatial frequency filtering of the images. Moreover, neural response magnitude and latency to face stimuli in the
superior colliculus significantly correlates with those in the pulvinar. Another cell recording study from the same group
showed that monkey pulvinar neurons display differential activity to specific emotional expressions (Maior et al., 2010).
Lastly, there is evidence about direct involvement of the superior colliculus in approach and defensive behavior in rodents
(Comoli et al., 2012; Liang & et al., 2015) as well as humans (Billington, Wilkie, Field, & Wann, 2011).
Behavioral studies on patients with selective pulvinar lesions also demonstrated that such patients show amarked impair-
ment in fear recognition for stimuli presented to the contralesional field when the damage involves the medial pulvinar,
thereby indicating the medial pulvinar as a point of convergence for both subcortical and cortical systems implicated in fear
perception (Ward, Calder, Parker, & Arend, 2007; Ward, Danziger, & Bamford, 2005). Furthermore, in a recent collaborative
studywith the group of Alain Ptito, we tested affective blindsight in two patients with hemispherectomy, DR and SE, who have
previously shown blindsight for non-emotional stimuli during redundant target experiments (Celeghin, Diano, et al., in
preparation). In such patients, the entire cortical mantel of one hemisphere has been removed for clinical purposes, including
the amygdala and large portions of the pulvinar, and leaving only the superior colliculus entirely intact. Using indirect meth-
ods we have been able to show nonconscious processing of unseen emotional stimuli in such patients. These initial findings
would suggest not only that the superior colliculus is involved in affective blindsight, but also, andmore conclusively, that the
cortex is not strictly necessary for affective blindsight to occur; although cortical contribution can clearly sustain several
aspects of the phenomenon, such facial mimicry or affective feelings (Anders et al., 2004, 2009; Tamietto et al., 2009).
Assuming the role of a functional pathway, are these structures also anatomically connected, thereby forming a structural
pathway?While tracer studies have demonstrated the existence in birds and rodents of anatomical connections between the
superior colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala, similar evidence in primates was lacking until recently (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa &
Adolphs, 2011). However, Day-Brown, Wei, Chomsung, Petry, and Bickford (2010) have shown that in the tree shrew (tupaia
belangeri), a prototypical primate for the anatomical organization of its visual system, projections to the lateral amygdala
originate also from the dorsal pulvinar that receives visual input from the superior colliculus, thereby forming a disynaptic
pathway to the amygdala. The authors suggested that this pathway potentially relays non-topographic visual information
from the SC to the amygdala, its functional role being that of alerting the animal to potentially dangerous signals
(Day-Brown et al., 2010).
In an attempt to verify whether such anatomical connections also exist in the human brain, we used DTI to characterize
in vivo the connectivity between the superior colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala in normal observers and its changes in
blindsight patient GY (Tamietto et al., 2012). We found fiber connections between pulvinar and amygdala and also between
superior colliculus and amygdala via the pulvinar in the healthy observer as well as in the patient GY. The destruction of the
visual cortex led to qualitative and quantitative modifications along the pathways connecting these three structures, and the
changes were confined to the patient’s damaged hemisphere, thereby strongly supporting the notion that the subcortical
route conveys visual information critical for sustaining affective blindsight. A recent tractography study from an indepen-
dent group used a different tractography method in twenty healthy subjects as well as in eight monkeys (macaca mulatta)
to trace possible direct connections between colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala (Rafal et al., submitted). Results in humans
were closely comparable to our previous findings and, in additions, the study provided the first anatomical evidence of direct
connections in the monkey brain.
6.2. Timing and speed of processing along the subcortical pathway
Another way to tackle the issue of whether the subcortical pathway to the amygdala plays a crucial role in affective blind-
sight is to consider the timing of responses in the subcortical structures involved, and to compare such responses to thosePlease cite this article in press as: Celeghin, A., et al. From affective blindsight to emotional consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition
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of processing for the subcortical over cortical route in emotion processing originated from the studies of LeDoux testing fear
conditioning in the auditory system of rodents, and has been transferred by analogy to nonconscious visual processing of
emotions in humans (LeDoux, 1996; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2011). However, the rodent auditory system and the human visual
system differ in major ways, and it is thus wise to move beyond analogy and metaphors. Admittedly, due to current method-
ological limitations of EEG and MEG in sampling neural activity in deep structures, evaluation and comparison of processing
speed in cortical and subcortical structures of the human brain is still an open issue. Data from cell recordings in monkeys
thus represent a more solid starting ground.
For example, the same study recording activity in the monkeys’ superior colliculus in response to face and face-like stim-
uli reported that superior colliculus neurons could encode face-like stimuli within the early 25 ms post stimulus onset, albeit
stimulus encoding further develops in the next 75 ms (Nguyen et al., 2014). For comparison, consider that the average
response latency in macaques’ V1 ranges from 60 to 80 ms and the response to face stimuli occur around 100–150 ms post
stimulus onset (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Schmolesky et al., 1998). According to the authors, superior colliculus neurons
filter face-like patterns with short latency to enable rapid processing of coarse facial information, while stimulus categoriza-
tion develops in later processing phases through feedback from upstream areas. Likewise, the earliest response latency in
visually responsive pulvinar neurons that differentiates between facial expressions were shorter than 100 ms, but ranged
widely, i.e. up to 300 ms (Maior et al., 2010). This distribution of response latency suggests that the pulvinar mediates intra-
cortical connections as well as faster subcortical feedforward connections to the amygdala. Lastly, response latency in the
monkey amygdala selective for faces and facial expressions ranges from 100 to 150 ms (Gothard, Battaglia, Erickson,
Spitler, & Amaral, 2007; Kuraoka & Nakamura, 2007).
Human studies using EEG and MEG have provided mixed results. One study combining MEG and MRI methods reported
early event-related synchronization in the pulvinar at about 10–20 ms after presentation of fearful faces, followed by
event-related synchronization in the amygdala at 20–30 ms after onset, whereas synchronization in the striate cortex
occurred 40–50 ms after stimulus onset (Luo et al., 2007). Another study revealed dissociation between rapid amygdala
responses to automatic fearful face processing and later responses that interacted with voluntary attention. In fact, a rapid
increase in gamma band activity in response to threatening faces (30–60 ms) was shown to be independent of task load,
while a significant interaction of emotion with attention manipulation was seen at later latencies (280–340 ms) (Luo
et al., 2010). Finally, two recent MEG studies used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) to test the explanatory power of the sub-
cortical route to amygdala versus a model predicting only cortical mediation over amygdala activity. Early brain activity was
better explained by a model including a subcortical pathway, whereas at longer latencies both models had comparable
explanatory power (Garrido et al., 2012; Garvert et al., 2014).
Besides data from specific studies, a more theoretical consideration is important when discussing the alleged speed of
the subcortical route for nonconscious emotion perception. In fact, the debate often concentrates on the timing of neuronal
firing in one or another brain area following presentation of emotional stimuli. However, the crucial aspect, in evolutionary
terms, is not which brain area starts firing first, but which neural pathway supports quicker implementation of the instru-
mental and expressive affective programs typically associated to emotional responses (de Gelder et al., 2011). There is
indeed no obvious or direct relation between the latency of neural activity in different brain areas and the latency required
by that activity to trigger a behavioral response. The only study that investigated spontaneous facial reactions to emotional
stimuli in patients with blindsight found that expressive reactions are triggered faster when the emotional stimulus is pro-
jected to the blind field and likely processed by the subcortical pathway to the amygdala (Tamietto et al., 2009). Moreover,
it should be bared in mind that an appropriate instrumental response may also include the absence of over behavior, such
as during freezing or ‘‘attentive immobility’’ when threat is perceived at a distance. A common finding in behavioral studies
on humans is the slowing down of RTs for negative stimuli, such as fearful or angry expressions (e.g., Tamietto, Latini
Corazzini, de Gelder, & Geminiani, 2006). It has been suggested that slower response latencies to threatening stimuli
are induced by amygdala activity and reflect immobility, analogous to freezing in animals (Sagaspe, Schwartz, &
Vuilleumier, 2011).7. From integration of conscious and nonconscious emotion perception to emotional consciousness
Is the processing of unseen emotional signals confined to the nonconscious domain, or may it influence our conscious
perception of, and reactions to, the seen world? Several studies on affective blindsight have used indirect methods to inves-
tigate possible on-line interactions between consciously and nonconsciously perceived emotions, as well as the influence
exerted by the former over ongoing recognition of seen stimuli (Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al., 2014; de Gelder et al.,
2001; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008). Unimodal (visual/visual) and cross-modal interactions (visual/auditory) between con-
sciously and nonconsciously perceived emotional stimuli have been reported to occur in affective blindsight patients. For
example, in patient GY conscious recognition of facial expressions is speeded up if another face showing the same expression
is presented to the blind field (de Gelder et al., 2001, 2005). Interestingly, preliminary findings indicate that an unseen stim-
ulus may also bias responses to a seen stimulus with very different physical properties, such as a facial and a bodily expres-
sion, providing they to convey a congruent emotional meaning (Tamietto, Geminiani, & de Gelder, 2006). The same type of
interaction has also been studied in multisensory conditions with unseen visual stimuli modulating the auditory processingPlease cite this article in press as: Celeghin, A., et al. From affective blindsight to emotional consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition
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emotional prosody of a sentence fragment (de Gelder et al., 2002, 2005).
Partially different results have been recently reported in two studies on hemianopic patients who did not show behav-
ioral evidence of blindsight (Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al., 2014). Such patients exhibited faster responses to seen happy
faces in their intact visual field when unseen fearful faces were concurrently presented to their blind field. Thus, in the pre-
sent case there was not a congruency effect between seen and unseen expressions, as reported in patient GY, but a more
generalized boosting effect of unseen fearful expressions. This outcome has been suggested to reflect early activation of
the subcortical pathway for implicit fear perception. In a follow up study with EEG, the amplitude of the N170 elicited by
seen happy faces selectively increased when an unseen fearful face was concurrently presented to the blind field of right
hemianopic patients (Cecere et al., 2014). These interesting findings are not necessarily in contrast with the previous reports
on patient GY. As it happens, they suggest an intriguing difference between patients displaying affective as well as
‘‘non-affective’’ blindsight, such as GY, and hemianopic patients who do not have blindsight but nevertheless are influenced
by fearful expressions in the blind field. Indeed, both phenomena may be mediated by a visual system deprived of its primary
visual cortex input but with intact subcortical structures, and thus share propensities to nonconscious emotion processing.
However, the possibly different role of spared extrastriate visual areas may explain the different effects of the interaction
between seen and unseen affective stimuli. Therefore, patients such as GY, in whom blindsight for emotions as well as
for various non-emotional visual properties converge, can tell us something about the interaction of the two phenomena,
whereas patients with hemianopia without blindsight can reveal possible dissociations. This issue clearly deserves further
study and a direct comparison or the two populations with identical stimuli, settings and experimental design.
As we noted already, affective blindsight offers a unique window on the vestigial properties implemented in subcortical
structures to encode and promote reactions in response to emotional stimuli. These properties are present in the intact brain
as well, but tend to be overruled or inhibited by cortical processes. In fact, physiological responses in healthy observers tend
to be faster or stronger when the eliciting emotional stimuli are not consciously processed (Williams et al., 2004). Likewise,
spontaneous facial reactions occur faster for unseen than seen facial or bodily expressions in blindsight patients (Tamietto
et al., 2009), and peripheral arousal, as indexed by pupil dilation, is enhanced for unaware stimuli in both, patients with
affective blindsight or patients with neglect (Tamietto et al., 2015). This enhanced influence of nonconscious emotions is
in line with evidence that cortical activity may exert an inhibitory modulation over subcortical areas (Bush & Sejnowski,
1996). Absence or reduction of such inhibition during nonconscious perception of emotional stimuli could also explain
the apparently paradoxical finding that subcortical activity can be enhanced during nonconscious compared to conscious
perception of emotional stimuli in healthy subjects (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Williams,
Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004). Likewise, conscious perception of the eliciting stimulus can overweight sub-
jective affective experience in response to an aversively conditioned stimulus, and the decoupling between phenomenal
affective experience and actual physiological changes is associated with increased activity in the ventro-lateral prefrontal
cortex (Anders et al., 2004, 2009).
The basic physiological reactions triggered by unseen emotional stimuli involve the moment-to-moment mapping of our
bodily states and interoceptive information crucial for homeostatic regulation. Because homeostatic processes provide the
sense of invariance that accompanies every subjective experience, they constitute a neurobiological mechanism for the
invariance of the sense of self and the continuity of our first-person experience of the world (Damasio, 1999; Park &
Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Tsuchiya & Adolphs, 2007). Accordingly, basic aspects of the physiological reactions to emotional stim-
uli, including reactions to stimuli that are not consciously perceived, overlap with physiological responses related to correc-
tions of homeostatic imbalance and thought to be necessary for the general level of consciousness (Damasio, 1999; Damasio
& Carvalho, 2013; Zeman, 2001). It is no coincidence that these emotional responses are controlled by neural structures in
the brainstem that also control the level of consciousness. Therefore, even when we remain unaware of the external deter-
minant of an emotional response, such that the eliciting stimulus does not become a content of our conscious visual expe-
rience, the chain of physiological reactions it triggers nevertheless contributes to modulate our state of vigilance and
behavior, which are constitutive components of our state consciousness.
But can the bodily changes triggered by unseen emotional stimuli be themselves experienced consciously as feelings?
Normally, we are not aware of such bodily responses if they cannot be linked to conscious representations of their external
(e.g., an angry expression or a sudden noise) or internal causes (e.g., our thoughts). Therefore, both the external determinants
as well as the associated physiological responses can fail to become the content of our conscious experience. As we discussed
already, passive exposure to unseen facial or bodily expressions in blindsight or healthy participants can induce subtle
changes in the observer’s facial muscles or arousal responses the subject remains unaware of (Dimberg et al., 2000;
Tamietto et al., 2009). Nevertheless, our behavior can still be modulated by unseen emotional signals seemingly without
any accompanying conscious feeling. For example, consumption behaviors or preference judgments can be influenced by
exposure to masked facial expressions, despite subjective feelings remain unaltered (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). Also,
a patient with profound impairment in taste perception (ageusia) due to bilateral damage involving the gustatory cortex,
could not consciously distinguish between sweet or saline beverages and did not report any associated conscious feeling,
but still consistently preferred the sugar solution when provided with the opportunity to choose (Adolphs, Tranel,
Koenigs, & Damasio, 2005).
It is conceivable, however, that in specific situations or clinical conditions, such as alexithymia, pathological anxiety or
depression we can become aware of our physiological changes without any conscious representation of their underlyingPlease cite this article in press as: Celeghin, A., et al. From affective blindsight to emotional consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition
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experience, while the triggering events do not. One study on patients with cortical blindness due to V1 lesions has shown
that the presentation of an unseen stimulus previously paired with an aversive event enhances eye-blink startle reflex,
and this enhancement corresponded to the reported level of negative emotional feelings (Anders et al., 2004). Yet it is
unknown whether such feelings can be induced by unseen stimuli intrinsically emotional, like facial expressions, and
whether they can influence the above-chance discrimination between different unseen emotional stimuli reported in
patients with affective blindsight.
Fifteen years of investigation on affective blindsight have contributed to our understanding of the neurobiological basis
and of psychophysiological responses to emotional visual stimuli not perceived consciously. This provides important new
directions for our understanding of the visual system and of emotion mechanisms. Even more remarkably, affective blind-
sight offers a unique and valuable testing ground to conjointly study and to link within an integrated theoretical framework
emotion and consciousness.Conflict of interest
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